with the spectrums of F° and G° being finite? For what class of games, g" has a unique point? Here we try to answer these questions by giving some sufficient conditions. 2* In this section we prove the following results. THEOREM 1. Let K λ (x, y) and K 2 (x, y) be continuous on 0 ^ x, y ^ 1. Let K 2 (x, y) be concave in y for each x. Then there is an equilibrium {F\ G°) such that G° is a degenerate probability distribution and F° is concentrated at most at two points. THEOREM 2. Let K^x, y) and K 2 (x, y) be continuous on 0 ^ x 9 y ^ 1. Let (d^/dy^Kzix, y) ^ 0. Then there is an (F°, G°) e <£ with the spectrum of F° and G° finite. 265 
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T. PARTHASARATHY AND T. E. S. RAGHAVAN We need the following theorem of Bohnenblust, Karlin, and Shapley [1] in the sequel. PROPOSITION Here (X ly λ 2 , •• ,λ Λ+1 ) is a probability vector.
REMARK. Theorems 1 and 2 are known for zero-sum games [1] , [2] . Our proof follows similar lines.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the result when K 2 (x, y) is strictly concave in y for each x.
Let (F°, G°) e gf. Since K 2 (x, y) is strictly concave in y, σ(G°), the spectrum of G° contains just one element, say y°.
We claim ψ(y) ^ 0 for all y, for otherwise K 2 {x, y°) -K 2 (x, y') < 0 for all x in C and for some y f .
Thus
is convex for each x and continuous in x for each y over the compact set C it follows from the above proposition that for some 0 ^ λ ^ 1
for all y. Define F* = Xl Xι + (1 -X)I X2 . Here I x stands for the degenerate distribution at x. Clearly (Fj°)e^. The general case is handled by approximating K 2 {x, y) by a sequence of strictly concave functions in y. For the proof of Theorem 2 we need the following lemma of Glicksberg [2] . For the sake of completeness we reproduce the proof.
Proof. By Rollers theorem we know that h{y) has at most n roots. If it has exactly n roots p(y) = 0 is a choice. If h(y) has fewer than n roots, then p(y) is constructed as follows. Let y lf y 2 , • , y k be the roots of h(y). Let q(y) be a polynomial with the same roots and multiplicities. Then q(y) ^ 0 and of degree at most (n -1). Let m 4 be the multiplicity of y t . Then
Hence we have open sets E t around y t with h in
The complement of U E t is a compact set, hence h/q is the ratio of two continuous nonvanishing functions and that it achieves its minimum δ 0 . Hence for ε < min(<5 0 , δJ2) h(y) -εq(y) ;> 0. Let ε 0 be the supremum of all ε for which
has at least one more root for otherwise h(y) -e o q(y) would satisfy all the conditions that h(y) satisfies and we cound find an ε' > 0 with
which contradicts that ε 0 is the supremum. Therefore we either have a new root or at least the multiplicity of a former root is increased. The function h -ε o g ;> 0 satisfies
We may continue the process until we arrive at a p(y) satisfying the conditions of the lemma. Further one easily checks that this polynomial is unique. 
Proof of Theorem 2. First we prove the theorem when
K 2 (x, y) is of the form K t (x, y) = ΣJ-oflφOϊ/' with (S n βy n )K 2 (x f y) < 0. Let (F°, G°)e gf. Since K 2 {F\ G°) = maxK 2 (F°, y) and (d n /dy n )K 2 (F\ y) < 0
{x, y) having the same roots and multiplicities as that of p(y) -h(y).
Now we will show that the coefficients a t {x) are continuous in x 9 for i -0, 1, 2,
, n -1. Fix x = x 0 and consider Σ*=o <^i(^o)y i -K 2 (x 0f y). The polynomial Σ*=o cbi(^o)y ί is unique for otherwise we will have 2 distinct polynomials of degree less than n whose difference will have n roots counting multiplicities. This is clearly not possible. Thus for each fixed x the coefficients a t (x) are uniquely determined. In fact we may write n linear equations for the unknown a o (x), , α w _j(x). The matrix of coefficients in these equations is nonsingular and since this matrix is independent of x 9 it follows from the continuity of K 2 Thus P(F°, G°) = 0^ P{F\ y) = P(y) for all y. We therefore have {F\ G°) as an equilibrium point of the auxiliary game. We know from the first part that this can be replaced by (ί 7 *, G°) where σ(jF*) is a finite subset of σ(F°). We claim (F* f G°) is also an equilibrium point for the original game. To show this it is enough to prove # 2 (F*, G°) = P(F*, G°) for then K 2 (F*, G°) = P(F*, G°) ^ G°) (the other inequality cannot hold). Then K 2 (x, y) < P(x, y) for some x e σ(F*) (Z σ(F°) and yeσ(G Q ) and K 2 (x, y) £ P(x, y) for all (x, y). Combining these two statements we have 0 = K 2 {F\ G°) < P(F°, G°) 0 a contradiction. Hence the assertion. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
But \ Σ a i (x)y i dF fi {x) -K 2 (F°, y) has roots and multiplicities as that of P(y) -h(y). Since P(y) is unique P(y)
3. In this section we give a set of sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of optimal strategies and equilibrium points for continuous games.
DEFINITION. Let μ lf μ 2 be two probability measures on the unit interval. We say μ t ^ μ 2 if for some k > 0 μ x {E) ^ kμ 2 Proof of Theorem 3. It suffices to prove that the compact convex set of optimal strategies for each player has exactly one extreme point.
Let if possible μ lf μ 2 be two distinct extreme optimal strategies, say for player I. Since μ 1 ~ μ 2 we have a k > 2 such that μ λ (E) k μ 2 (E) for all E. Define
where 0<^ < 1 . k -1 When the spectrum of an optimal strategy for player II is the whole unit interval every optimal strategy for player I is an equalizer. Thus it is easily seen that μ' y μ" are two distinct optimal strategies for player I and that μ 2 = (μ f + μ")/2. This contradicts the fact that μ 2 is an extreme optimal for player I. Hence the theorem. REMARK 1. For example if every optimal strategy for each player possesses a continuous strictly positive density, then one can check that the conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied; hence such games will have unique optimal strategies. REMARK 2. For matrix games the notion of equivalence coincides with the notion of completely mixed strategies. REMARK 3. It would be interesting to know whether Theorem 3 is valid if we just assume that the spectrum of every optimal strategy for each player is the unit interval.
